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Human-system interactions have been largely overlooked in the traditional systems engineering 
process. Awareness of human factors (HF) has increased in the past few years, but the 
involvement of HF specialists is still often too little and too late. In systems involving long-
duration human space flight , it is essential that the human component be properly considered in 
the initial architectural definition phase, as well as throughout the system design process. HF 
analysis must include not only the strengths and lirrtitations of humans in general , but the 
variability between individuals and within an individual over time, and the dynarrtics of group 
interactions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Systems intended for human space flight have often been functional extensions of ground-based 
systems, with the hardware modified for the space environment. Even when systems have been 
developed from the start with the space (rrticrogravity, radiation , vacuum, meteoroid, etc.) 
environment in mind, the human component has often been added as an afterthought. For 
missions measured in days , the resulting need for the crew to accommodate the hardware has 
been an acceptable inconvenience. 
As longer-duration space flights become a reality, there will be an increased need to consider the 
human component and its interfaces as integral parts of the architecture from the beginning of 
the process. Hardships that might be considered part of the adventure for a short mission can 
become serious irritations when they continue for months or years , and adversely affect crew and 
system performance. 
A search of the 1990-2000 INCOSE Symposium database (350 pages of abstracts) discovered 
less than a dozen papers containing either the word 'human ' or 'space ' . Almost all of the papers 
on Human Factors addressed the issue of how HF needs to be included in the SE process, with 
the implication, if not the expressed statement, that HF was not being properly considered. The 
space-related papers were almost all on robotic space systems, and if they considered the human 
element at all , it was with regard to the design team or the ground controllers of the rrtission. 
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TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT SYSTEMS 
The traditional approach to human-machine systems generall y results in systems that fail to meet 
their performance specifications, and require the customer to delay acceptance and delivery, accept 
the system limitations until they can be fixed, or increase the number or qualifications of personnel 
needed for operations. (MacLeod) The fire detection and suppression (FDS) system for the Space 
Station is an example of the traditional approach. In the late 1980' s it was recognized that a fire in 
space might be difficult to detect, and the results could be catastrophic. If it became necessary to 
abandon the station there would be only one 'lifeboat' , and the fire might cut the crew off from it. 
The original FDS system architects used the model of a terrestrial building system, modified for the 
microgravity environment. Instead of a tank of water on the roof, tanks of pressurized inert gas were 
used. Instead of heat-sensitive passive fusible plugs, electro-optical smoke and flame detectors and a 
maze of 'avionics air' ducts were used. Instead of sprinkler heads in each room, valves with 
diffusing nozzles were provided in each rack, standoff, and other volume where a fire could occur. 
Networks of pipes and wires more complex than those used in most ground facilities connected the 
components to each other and to controlling computers. 
CO2 was selected as the suppressant (other agents were toxic , corrosive, and/or could not be 
removed by on board air cleaning equipment). Each tank had multiple pressure sensors and outlet 
valves, to prevent the inadvertent leakage of CO2 into the station, or overpressure that might result in 
tank rupture. Actively commanded normally-open valves were needed at the end of each pipe to 
control the CO2 flow, because it might not be possible to command a closed valve in the fire area to 
open, if the wiring was damaged. Since smoke doesn ' t rise or spread much in microgravity, a 
constantly moving airflow (fans and ducts) had to be provided through every potential fire volume to 
carry any combustion products to the associated smoke detector. The smoke detectors each included 
redundant sensors, a microprocessor, and a communications interface. Redundant copies of the FDS 
software had to be running on different computers , in case the fire occurred in a computer rack. 
Every problem that was found was solvable, but every solution brought new problems (unintended 
consequences) and increased system complexity. The system' s designers found themselves in a 
hole, and tried to solve the problem by digging harder. 
If a smoke or flame detector identified a fire, it would run an internal self-diagnostic routine, and 
then , if it confirmed the fire , it would notify the computer system, which would sound an alarm, 
close the CO2 valves not in the fire area, shut down all air flow to the affected part of the station, cut 
off electrical power to the area, and open the valves on one of the main CO2 tanks. The crew would 
leave the affected module and seal it off until the fire was out and the cabin air restored to breathable 
quality (a period of at least several hours, or considerably longer if the atmosphere had to be dumped 
overboard). Then they would try to recover the data and systems that would have been lost during 
the emergency shutdown. The used CO2 tank would be replaced on the earliest possible resupply 
flight. The FDS system consumed a significant, and increasing, portion of the station's scarce 
resources (weight, space, and computing and electrical power) , and did not involve the crew at ali , 
until after the emergency was over. Although the presence of a human crew was the driving force 
behind having an FDS system, they were not part of its architecture. 
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Eventually, the team recognized that it was time to stop digging, and take a look at the situation. 
If a fire started in still air in microgravity, it would likely either smother itself in its own smoke, 
or spread very slowly, in a more-or-less spherical manner. In either case, it would almost 
certainly cause a detectable failure of the equipment in which it occurred long before impacting 
anything else. The presence of a constant airflow would both feed and spread the fire. The CO2 
distribution plumbing would contain a large volume of air, all of which would be blown across 
the flame before the CO2 reached it, fanning it farther (even if the system worked as designed). 
The complexity of both the detection and suppression subsystems made some failure highly 
likely, and the consequences of a false alarm would probably be as bad as those of an actual fire. 
The need for directed airflow through and around every component in every rack would also 
severely constrain rack packaging. 
By the mid 1990's, reductions in Space Station resources made the FDS architecture, as it had 
evolved, untenable. A clean-sheet approach to FDS design considered the physics of 
microgravity combustion and the capabilities of the crew, and reduced the weight, volume, and 
resource needs of the system by 90 percent, while making the human component an integral part 
of the architecture. Each potential fire volume is now isolated from the rest of the station, and 
has a fire extinguisher hole in its front panel. A portable CO2 extinguisher is located at each end 
of each module. Only those few racks that require forced-air cooling (most are water-cooled) 
have smoke detectors. Other detectors are located in the air conditioning return ducts, to indicate 
if smoke is somewhere in the cabin. If a component failure indicates that a fire might exist, or 
smoke is detected, the computer system alerts the crew so they can look for other symptoms to 
verify and localize it, and take appropriate action. The smaller amount of CO2 in the portable 
extinguishers does not require that the crew evacuate the module in most cases. 
HUMAN FACTORS ACCEPTANCE 
A decade ago, HF was the ugly stepchild in the systems engineering family. HF engineers were 
lucky to be acknowledged, much less respected. In 1995, Buie & Vallone stated "As currently 
defined and practiced, the systems engineering process overlooks the design of human-system 
interaction as a systems engineering activity." According to MacLeod, "HF input into the design 
process occurs rather late in the design life cycle precluding any major HF influence in the all-
important early design processes. Moreover, the traditional and late use of Ergonomists results in 
some cases of their derogatory and fruitless naming as 'flower arrangers ' . This term in popular 
use in the UK aircraft industry .. . " 
A comparison of the 1990 and 1998 edi tions of Blanchard & Fabrycky shows how the 
acceptance of the HF specialty has improved, at least in academia, if not yet in practice. In the 
second edition, the human factors chapter (called Design for Manability) is 24 pages long, with 5 
subsections; in the third edition, the chapter (now called Design for Usability) is 30 pages long, 
with 7 subsections, and significantly more coverage of HF is incorporated into the general 
systems engineering process sections. The subsection on psychological factors is 450 percent 
larger in the later edition. 
The subsection on 'error analysis ' in the second edition listed, as possible causes: failure to 
comply with procedures, failure to obtain necessary data, failure to read displays correctly, 
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failure to operate controls properly, and failure to monitor and respond to changes ; i.e. , problems 
were bl amed on the crew. In the third edition , the possible causes of errors listed were: 
inadequate workspace layout, inadequate facilities , inadequate lighting temperature and sound 
levels, inadequate displays , inadequate training, inadequate management (communications and 
planning), and inadequate procedures and job aids ; i.e., the responsibility is placed on the 
system 's designers, not its users. 
The second edition said, "One of the major objectives in system design is to minimize, if not 
eliminate, the possibility of introducing human error . . . The primary source of failures is the 
human being." (p. 454). The third edition (p. 482) deleted these misanthropic statements 
completely. The authors now seem to have developed an appreciation for the human component 
of systems as something to be nurtured rather than feared. 
Within the past 5 years, the U.S . Army (MANPRINT) and the British Ministry of Defence have 
begun encouraging their contractors to integrate HF into the systems engineering process (Ward 
& Harmer) . These efforts , however, are still limited to the highest levels of the culture and 
process. 
COGNITIVE FUNCTION ALLOCATION 
A system specification should encompass the totality of human-machine system functional 
requirements and performance. The human operator is mainly considered by engineering 
processes to be a constraint on system design, without associated performance requirements. 
(MacLeod) 
System related cognitive functions are associated with the assessment and understanding of the 
work environment, system control and direction, system management, supervision of system task 
performance, and teamwork. Such functions have traditionally been assigned to the human 
component, in support of required system performance. Any improved approach must include 
the specification of system performance covering cognitive functions that may be allocated to 
engineered (non-human) components of the system where appropriate. 
Traditional application of HF (man is better at ' " , machine is better at . . . ) fails to consider 
individual differences and the complementary nature of the contributions of man and machine to 
system performance. HF input also generally occurs late in the development process, by which 
time a\l of the available alternatives may be fundamentally flawed. Human functionality should 
be addressed from the outset of system design so that human influences can be more readily 
considered during the physical design of the system. 
The term 'cognition ' can apply to functions and tasks resident in both man and machine. The 
cogniti ve function refers to the translation of intended tasks into activities. The essential role of 
cognitive functions is in maintaining stable system control. They represent a focused 
understanding of the state of system performance with relation to system work goals . The greater 
the degree of system automation, the greater becomes the importance of system feedback to the 
operator. 
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Functional specifications must capture the necessary cognitive functions required by the system, 
not the specific capabilities of the human operator. The specified cognitive functions might 
reside in the engineered system, the operator, or both. Functional allocation would be mainly an 
allocation of levels of control , considering the degree of automation and the feedback needs of 
the human in command of the system. The following figure shows a model of a human-machine 
system. The lines are shown without arrowheads since, in most cases , information flow can be in 
either direction. 
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The evolution of functional assignments is illustrated by the history of aircraft stall indicators. In 
early airplanes , the pilot was responsible for both sensory and cognitive functions, as he watched 
a piece of ribbon tied to a strut and took appropriate action . By mid-century, the machine had 
taken over the sensing functions, displaying airspeed and angle of attack on the instrument panel, 
while the pilot still decided what to do about it. On current aircraft, the machine performs the 
cognitive functions of situation assessment and advice in addition to sensing, and tells the crew 
what to do via a 'stick shaker' and/or voice instructions. 
GROUP DYNAMICS 
The spacecraft and its crew constitute a single dynamic system, in which the components are 
integrated by the flow of materials, manpower, and information. Other forces that can affect 
system performance include those originating within the individual crewmembers, at the group 
level , imposed by the system hardware and software, or imposed by the environment. 
An accurate statement and prediction of causal relationships for crew behavior is very difficult, 
as evidenced by the many theories put forth by psychologists and sociologists. Most theories of 
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human behavior are based on a static view, although dynamic interactions are the most important 
factor. (Upshaw) 
The Crew-System Interactions Model shown below relates the various system parameters 
affecting the crew in such a way that the situational variability of the crew interactions is 
accounted for. Although it is only an analytical model, it can provide insights into the 
functioning of the real system to help identify desirable crew norms and standards to ensure that 
mission objectives are met. . 
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Crew-System Interactions Model 
The uncensored daily Space Station logs that NASA formerly posted on the Internet provided 
insight into the everyday working of the station, and some of the human interactions that occur. 
Many of the entries indicate the crew's irritation with the software provided to them: "We are 
able to log in, but the program either locks up or won't launch when we try to run it", and "We 
are getting blocked from changing the printer job cue [sic]. Apparently we don't have the right 
permissions." After spending half a day seeking a storage bag that should have been found in 
two minutes, the station commander complained that the inventory management system database 
had been corrupted by bad data from mission controllers on Earth. In another passage, he scolded 
the two flight control centers (Houston and Moscow) for not seeing the Space Station as "more 
of a unified environment." 
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OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT 
Prolonged exposure to cosmic rays may damage regions of the brain responsible for cognition, 
decision-making and language comprehension. This represents a significant danger when a trip 
to Mars is expected to take six to ten months - each way, and visits to the outer planets much 
longer. These effects are in addition to the restlessness, anxiety, sleep disturbances, 
disorientation, anger, and decreased performance that result from long term isolation in any 
environment (e.g., cabin fever). If any of the crew experiences these symptoms, it could 
endanger the entire crew and the mission. 
A computer system that could remotely monitor the cognitive functioning of astronauts by using 
acoustic measures of their speech would allow NASA to respond to changes during a mission. 
Brown University recently received a NASA grant to develop a system to monitor the cognitive 
abilities of astronauts during a proposed manned mission to Mars in 2020. The research project is 
based on new insights into how brains work. Complex acts such as understanding the meaning of 
a sentence, reaching a decision or planning ahead involve activity in many parts of the brain, 
including the basal ganglia. 
While such a crew monitoring system could provide useful advice on the capabilities of the 
human crew, it is unlikely that it will be completely trusted, at least any time soon. Computer 
problems continue to be the major operational difficulties for both manned and unmanned space 
vehicles. Ground control centers would have to have override control for situations where the 
computers and the crew each judged the other to be cognitively impaired. System architectures 
will .have to allow for the degradation of the capabilities of both silicon-based and carbon-based 
cognitive system components. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A comprehensive approach to architecting human space flight systems must consider all 
elements in the system and their interactions from the beginning, and allocate functions where 
they can best be performed. The architecting process should start with a clear mission statement, 
followed by a thorough understanding of the operations concept, the functions to be performed, 
and the environment in which the system will operate. Based on this knowledge, the architecture 
can be defined, with the appropriate functions allocated to the vehicle, crew, hardware, and 
software. Since "To err is human ... " , failure modes and effects analysis must give the same 
consideration to potential human errors as to hardware or software failures. It must be assumed 
that the crew will make mistakes, in spite of any efforts to minimize or eliminate them. 
The traditional paradigm of man/machine systems should be replaced with one that allocates 
functions based on whether they are more cogniti ve or mechanistic, with the cognitive functions 
divided between human and engineered components. Mechanistic functions could be automated, 
with provision for contingency override. Routine cognitive functions could be automated with 
human oversight. Advisory functions would be automated, but would require human 
concurrence. Adaptive software would be able to assume increased responsibility as its 
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experience level increased, but the human element (on-board and/or on Earth) must retain the 
final decision authority and responsibility for policy interpretation. 
The human environment includes adaptation to inter- and intra-group dynamics . System 
architectures must include man-man as well as man-machine interfaces . Forces acting both 
within and between the components and the external environment affect the system' s 
performance. As the distance from Earth increases, the level of autonomous operation of the 
integrated spacecraft system also increases. This will likely lead to an increase in group cohesion 
(with the accompanying risk of groupthink) and less dependence on ground controllers. 
For long-duration missions, training will have to be built into the system architecture. The limits 
of human memory will prevent training to the same level of intensity as a Shuttle mission, while 
the total number of tasks will be much greater. An on-board continuous education program will 
have to be part of the system if the crew are to have the skill proficiency levels needed at each 
phase of the mission . Accurate mental models provide useful knowledge of system operations 
when learned procedures fail, especially in emergency situations. The training process will have 
to form the crew's different mental models into ones that are at least compatible, if not identical. 
One way to implement the man-machine allocation of functions would be to define an 'electronic 
crewman ' as part of the system architecture, to serve as a repository for those cognitive functions 
assigned to the machine. 
The change from the traditional technology-centered approach to a more human-centered 
systems engineering process, where the needs , capabilities, and limitations of the human element 
become key design drivers, will require credible and long-term commitment from academia, 
government and industry. The steps taken to date are more a statement of intentions than an 
accomplished transformation -- a good beginning, but they will not have a lasting effect by 
themselves. Future architectures for long-duration manned space flight systems must recognize 
the mutual interdependence of the automated systems and the crew. 
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